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COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION: THE LAYING SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION

The necessity and desirability of administrative agencies' is
an accepted tenet of our American public law system.2 Through
grants of delegated power Congress defines what ends the agency is to guard and what means should be used in regulating both
3
public and private activities to protect and maintain those ends.
Such grants of power, however, require safeguards to insure
that agency action is in accordance with Congressional intent.4
The control device best suited for this purpose is legislative in
nature: the laying system.5
1. Kenneth Culp Davis defines an administrative agency as "a governmental authority, other than a court and other than a legislative body,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication,
rulemaking, investigating, prosecuting, negotiating, settling, or informally acting." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.01 (3d ed. 1972).
2. Whether administrative agencies are themselves constitutional
has been long settled. It is now recognized that the existence of an administrative agency does not violate the separation of powers principle,
nor does the creation of the agency involve an unconstitutional delegation of power. Legislation and administration are complementary processes which function side by side to perform many complex operations
of modern government. Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making, 32 U. CIN. L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1963).

3. Schwartz, The Administrative Process And Congressional Control, 16 FED. B.J. 519, 520 (1956), states:
The representative legislative assembly is peculiarly inappropriate
itself to perform these continuous tasks of regulation and guardianship. It has had to delegate their performance to the administrative
process. Indeed, the need for an effective instrument through which
these tasks could be performed has been perhaps the primary reason for the growth of that process.
4. Schwartz, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1032
(1955); see FitzGerald, Congressional Oversight or Congressional Foresight: Guidelines from the Founding Fathers, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 429
(1976).
5. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 64

(1976);

Andrews, Relationships Between Administratorsand the CaliforniaLegislature, 44 CAL. L. REv. 293 (1956); Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L.
REV. 638 (1956); Boner & Stayton, Co-ordination in Government: A
Legislative Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 20 (1960); Melville, Legislative
Control Over Administrative Rule Making, 32 U. CIN. L. REV. 33 (1963);
Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of LawsShould Legislators Supervise Administrators,41 CAL. L. REV. 565 (1953);
Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 415 (1976); Schwartz, Legislative Oversight: Control of Admini-

strative Agencies, 43 A.B.A.J. 19 (1957); Schwartz, The Administrative
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The laying system originated in the English political system.6 Although there has never been a statute of general applicability requiring all administrative regulations to be laid before
Parliament,7 most British statutes which delegate certain powers
to agencies require that regulations promulgated in pursuance of
such statutes be laid before Parliament.8 In this form, the
laying system allows Parliament to annul or modify a given
regulation if the promulgated rule, or subordinate legislation as
the English term it, does not accord with Parliament's intent
This system of review has been modified slightly in recent years,
but the principle of control remains the same-to supervise the
administration of delegated powers where such a grant may be
misconstrued, overstepped, or abused by the administrative
agency.10
In the United States the laying system has been used in two
broad patterns. First, the few states that have incorporated a
mechanism for legislative review in their administrative procedure acts apply the control to all administrative rules promulgated. 1 These provisions are mandatory and are supplemented
occasionally by other types of non-legislative controls such as the
requirement of attorney general approval. 1 2 Second, Congress
has used the laying system only in extraordinary circumstances
where it determined that direct legislative supervision was required. 13 Examples of this usage of the laying system at the
federal level are the various Reorganization Acts from 1939 to
197114 and the atomic energy legislation of the early 1950's. 1"
Thus, even though the use of the laying system in the United
Process And Congressional Control, 16 FED. B.J. 519 (1956); Stone, The
Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After, 52 CAL. L. REV.
513 (1964); Note, Laying on the Table-A Device for Legislative Control
over Delegated Powers, 65 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1952).
6. Carr, Legislative Controls Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: II. Parliamentary Supervision In Britain, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1045,
1045-46 (1955). See generally J. KERSELL, PARLIAMENTARY SUPERVISION
OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION (1960).
7. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 639 (1956).

8. Id. at 638-39.

9. Id.
10. Id.

11. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.20.400, .410, 44.62.320 (1976); NEB. REV.
§ 84-904 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 308 (West 1976).
12. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-169 (West Cum. Supp. 1977);

STAT.

§ 3.560(145) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
13. See Boner & Stayton, Co-ordinationin Government: A Legislative Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 20, 26-33 (1960); Schwartz, Legislative
Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1035-37 (1955).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970). For legislative history surrounding the enactment of the 1949 Reorganization Act, see H.R. REP. No. 23, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-7 (1949).
15. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
MICH. STAT. ANN.
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States has by no means attained the popularity that it enjoys in
England, its method and purpose are generally the same-to
maintain agency accountability to the legislature through legislative review of administrative actions.16
Doubts about the constitutionality of the laying system in
the United States have proved a hindrance on its usage.'" In
1933 Attorney General Mitchell seriously questioned the system's validity, specifically noting that it might involve separation
of powers problems and the deprivation of the Presidential veto
power. 18 New Hampshire adopted this line of reasoning,' 9 and
Wisconsin's legislature changed its legislative control system to
one resembling judicial control, due to a negative report from
the state's attorney general.2" But the arguments in favor of the
laying system have started to overcome any doubts about its
constitutionality; 2 1 for example, New Jersey and Colorado courts
have ruled specifically that their laying systems are constitutional. 22 Currently, the question is not whether the control is
constitutional, but whether the laying system is the most effecof legislatively delegated
tive mechanism to regulate the exercise
23
power by administrative agencies.
This comment will describe and analyze the British laying
system and its new found effectiveness. Then the United States
experience will be delineated critically at both the state and
federal levels. Both the practicality and the constitutionality of
the various systems utilized by the state and federal governments
will be examined. Finally, an evaluation of which form of laying
16. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 122-27 (6th ed.

64 (1976); W. GELLHORN &
1974).
17. Ginnane, The Control Of Federal Administration By Congressional Resolutions And Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953); Jaffe,
An Essay On Delegation Of Legislative Power: 1, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
359, 371-74 (1947).
18. 37 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 56 (1933).
19. Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950).
20. 43 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 350 (Wis. 1954). See Boles, The Post-Hearing
Stage Of The Administrative Rule Making Process In Wisconsin: The
Conservation Commission, 40 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (1956); Helstad, New
Law On Administrative Rule-Making, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 407; Helstad &
Boyer, Legislative Controls of Administrative Rule Making, 41 A.B.A.J.
C.

1048 (1955).

21. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 64 (1976); Boisvert, A
Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 651-61 (1956); Cooper & Cooper, The
Legislative Veto And The Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962);
Schwartz, The Administrative Process And Congressional Control, 16
FED. B.J. 519 (1956); Schwartz, Legislative Control Of Administrative
Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1031, 1042-45 (1955); S. REP. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1949).

22. Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d

498 (1950); Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 572 (1972).
See also
23. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 64 (1976).
FitzGerald, Congressional Oversight or Congressional Foresight: Guidelines from the Founding Fathers, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (1976).
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system is best suited to control administrative action, and a
determination of how this safeguard should be used to insure
agency accountability to the legislature will be made.
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

A HistoricalPerspective
The British control subordinate legislation 24 in three ways.
First, Parliament has the opportunity to examine the power of
the agency to make subordinate legislation when it considers the
merits of the proposed enabling act. 25, Second, many subordinate laws are required by enabling acts, what the British call
parent acts, to be laid before Parliament.26 Third, Parliament
may consider motions which specifically question agencies concerning certain subordinate laws. 27 The second control, the laying system, will be discussed here.
The British laying system emerged in 1833, and has developed into an effective control device. In 1833, Parliament authorized certain judges to promulgate rules of procedure for
their courts; the enabling act required that the rules be laid
before Parliament and were not to take effect for six weeks.
During this time period legal experts were to evaluate the rule,
and Parliament had the power to annul it if it saw fit. 2s Thus,
the negative form of laying was introduced into the English legal
system, and it grew both in popularity and usage. Generally,
the negative laying provisions were embodied in the enabling
acts and provided that all rules promulgated in pursuance of
Parliament's grant of power be laid before Parliament for a given
number of days, or that rules be laid before Parliament in draft
form with Parliament having the power to halt further consider26
ation on the drafted rule.
The affirmative laying system was introduced in 1897.30
Under this affirmative system an instrument or rule was not
allowed to take effect until Parliament approved the rule by a
24. Subordinate legislation in Britain is equivalent to promulgated
rules by an administrative agency in the United States.
25. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 79
(5th ed. 1973).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 80, 95.
28. An Act for the further Amendment of the Law, and the better
Advancement of Justice, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 1; Carr, Legislative
Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: II. Parliamentary
Supervision In Britain, 30 N.Y.U.L REV. 1031, 1045 (1955).
29. Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making,
32 U. CIN. L. REV. 33, 40 (1963).
See Carr, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: II. Parliamentary Supervision In
Britain,30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1955).

30. Military Manoeuvers Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c, 43, § 3.
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positive resolution.3 1 The affirmative method was used where
matters of contemporary importance were delegated, and generally these matters consisted of levying taxes or modifying a
statute's terms.32 As a result, the affirmative laying system
emerged as a more effective and powerful control device than its
negative counterpart because procedurally affirmative approval
required greater parliamentary effort. The government had to
make a motion to approve the subordinate legislation, thus
requiring the movant to find time for debate and to make sure
33
that an adequate number of supporters were present.
The advent of the Second World War and the consequent
increase in subordinate legislation made revision of the laying
system necessary.3 4 The members of Parliament did not have
time to consider adequately the flood of regulations issuing from
British agencies. As a result of reform studies the Parliament
established the Select Committee on Statutory Rules and Orders,
The Committee
popularly known as the Scrutiny Committee. 3
examined every rule laid before the House of Commons to
determine whether the House's attention should be drawn to it.
The Scrutiny Committee did not concern itself with questions of
policy or the merits of a given rule. Rather, it was authorized to
draw the House's attention to a given rule when a specified condition existed; one such condition being any unusual or unThe name of the comexpected use of statutory power.3
31. Carr, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: II. Parliamentary Supervision In Britain, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1045,
1047 (1955).
32. Id.

33. Id. With the negative laying system, any single member of the
House of Commons may move for annulment.
34. Id. at 1049-50.
35. Id.
36. The Committee was given seven grounds to judge whether House
attention should be invoked:
(i) that it imposes a charge on the public revenues or contains
provisions requiring payments to be made to the Exchequer or any Government Department or to any local or
public authority in consideration of any license or consent,

or of any service to be rendered, or prescribes the amount
of any such charge or payments:
(ii) that it is made in pursuance of an enactment containing
specific provisions excluding it from challenge in the
courts, either at all times or after the expiration of a specified period:
(iii) that it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use
of the powers conferred by the Statute under which it
is made:
(iv) that it purports to have retrospective effect where the
parent Statute confers no express authority so to provide:
(v)

that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in the
publication or in the laying of it before Parliament:

(vi) that there appears to have been unjustifiable delay in
sending a notification to Mr. Speaker under the proviso
to subsection (1) of section four of the Statutory Instru-
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mittee was changed in 1946 to the Select Committee on
Statutory Instruments, 37 and since that time it has become an
effective and essential part of the laying system.3 8 The Scrutiny
Committee makes continuing supervision by Parliament possible
and helps correct errors and omissions of executive departments
39
through its legislative scrutiny.
The Laying System Today
As a general rule, British enabling or parent acts require
that subordinate legislation promulgated under such an act be
laid before Parliament. The laying system usually takes one of
six forms. The subordinate legislation is either: laid before
Parliament with no further directions; laid and made subject to
annulment within forty days; laid and made subject to affirmative resolution; laid in draft and made subject to affirmative
resolution; laid in draft and made subject to annulment within
forty days; or laid with legal effect and made subject to annulment. 40 Following a brief description of each of these laying
systems, proceedings in parliamentary committees will be described and the total system's effectiveness evaluated.
Laying with no further directions is, in effect, an informational device. Under this method the subordinate legislation is
valid when made. Members of Parliament are not empowered
ments Act, 1946, where an Instrument has come into operation before it has been laid before Parliament:
(vii) that for any special reason, its form or purport calls for
elucidation.'
507 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 555 (1952), cited in Carr, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: II. ParliamentarySupervision In Britain, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1045, 1050 n.21 (1955).
37. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36. This
Act, adopted during the time the United States was considering its Administrative Procedure Act, codified many of the former requirements
of the laying system. One example of such codification was the Act's
requirement that the laying period be 40 days. Strangely enough, however, the Act did not require that all rules shall be laid before Parlia-

ment.

38. The House of Lords also has an administrative reviewing committee, the Special Orders Committee. This standing committee examines all subordinate legislation to determine whether a measure can
pass through the House of Lords without special attention. The Special
Orders Committee works best when it is allowed to examine the merits
of the subordinate legislation. If this power to examine the merits is
absent, however, the Committee only guides the House of Lords in approving or rejecting the legislation. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 88

(5th ed. 1973);

Melville,

Legislative

Control

Over Administrative Rule Making, 32 U. CIN. L. REv. 33, 41 (1963).
39. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 650 (1956). See
Boner & Stayton, Co-ordination in Government: A Legislative Responsibility, 39 TEx. L. REV. 20, 34-35 (1960).
40. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7881 (5th ed. 1973).
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to move for the rule's annulment, nor is the government required
to obtain a resolution before the subordinate legislation becomes
operative. This control device simply reports the agency action
and does not provide Parliament with any power to hold the
4
agency accountable. 1
Enabling acts which require that subordinate legislation be
laid before Parliament and made subject to annulment within
forty days are the most common control provision. An example
of the language which invokes this type of control is: "'Any
power conferred by this Act to make regulations [etc.] shall be
exercisable by statutory instrument which shall be subject to
annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of
Parliament.' "42 Procedurally, this negative laying system requires that every statutory instrument, equivalent to a proposed
regulation in the United States, be laid before Parliament for
forty days. 43 Within those forty days either House of Parliament may pass a resolution requesting Her Majesty to annul the
subordinate legislation. Her Majesty then revokes the instrument by an Order in Council; the revocation does not affect the
validity of anything done in the past and does not prevent the
creation of new rules. 44 Generally, Parliament has the power
only to accept or reject the subordinate legislation, and not to
amend it. Subordinate legislation subject to this procedure is
unless Pareffective when made, and maintains its effectiveness
4
liament annuls it within the forty day period. "
Affirmative laying procedures theoretically are designed for
important substantive legislation. There are two types of af41. Id. at 81. A current example of laying with no further directions
is found in the National Insurance Act of 1970. Section one of the Act
gives the Attendence Board, as defined and created in section five, the
power to promulgate regulations for the payment of certain benefits
under the Act. Section 8 (4) provides that regulations promulgated by
the Board, which in effect are regulations which bring into operation
parts of the Act, are not required to be laid before Parliament. National
Insurance Act, 1970, c. 51.

42. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82
(5th ed. 1973). The Statutory Instruments Act of 1946 codified many of
the modern laying provisions described herein. Before this Act was es-

tablished the period of laying varied considerably, and pre-1946 language
to invoke negative laying read as follows:
'Any regulations [etc.] made under this Act shall be laid before
Parliament immediately after they are made, and if either House,
within the period of forty days after the regulations are so laid

before it, resolves that the regulations be annuled, the regulations
shall thereupon cease to have effect, but without prejudice to the
validity of anything previously done thereunder or to the making
of new regulations.'
Id. at 81-82.
43. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 5 (2).
44. Id. at § 5(1).
45. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 82
(5th ed. 1973).
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firmative laying procedures. First, some enabling acts provide
that subordinate legislation shall be of no effect unless approved
by a resolution of each House of Parliament. Second, other
enabling acts provide that subordinate legislation shall cease to
have effect on the expiration of a given period unless, before
such period expires, it has been approved by resolution of each
House of Parliament."' One main distinguishing feature between the negative laying system and the affirmative laying
system is that with the latter the government must find time to
make and debate a resolution. Another distinguishing feature is
that a substantive law made under the negative laying system is
47
not operative until approved.
Rules laid in draft and made subject to either affirmative
resolution or annulment within forty days involve subordinate
legislation not yet made. An enabling act using the affirmative
method will provide that an order shall not be made until the
draft has been approved by resolution of each House. 48 Less
common are rules laid in draft subject to annulment within forty
days. If not annulled the order shall be made.4 9 Finally,
circumstances may arise which require a rule to take effect
before Parliament has an opportunity to review it. To meet this
situation a variation of the affirmative laying system has been
developed whereby certain notice requirements must be met.
Once these notice requirements are filed the rule becomes effective subject to parliamentary annulment.-'"
There are still situations, ever so rare, where no laying
requirement exists. Generally, these involve enabling acts of
specific applicability where the danger of administrative abuse of
a parliamentary grant of power is slight.5"
The six above methods describe the various types of laying
systems employed in Britain. The effectiveness of many of
these methods can be attributed directly to the parliamentary
committees, which have taken the enormous burden of reviewing every regulation off the shoulders of each member of Parliament.
46. Id. at 83.

47. Id. at 84. See Metcalfe v. Cox, [1895] A.C. 328.

Metcalfe held
that where Parliament indicates that an affirmative laying system is to
be used, Parliament must give its approval for the subordinate rule to
become operative.
48. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84-85
(5th ed. 1973).
49. Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36, § 6.
50. Id. at § 4(1), as amended by Laying of Documents Before Parliament (Interpretation) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 59, § 2.
51. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 86-

87 (5th ed. 1973).
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The Screening Committees
Prior to the creation of these parliamentary committees,
commentators viewed the British system as less than desirable
because legislators did not have time to consider the plethora of
subordinate legislation promulgated by the various agencies."
However, the parliamentary committees solved this problem. The
committees now inspect the rules and give Parliament notice to
consider a specific rule when the rule comes under one of the
5 3
committees' eight guidelines.
The Select Committee on Statutory Instruments in the
House of Commons examines the formal results of delegated
power, as it considers every rule or order promulgated by an
agency. The Committee's main inquiry is whether the subordinate legislation is the type of instrument which Parliament
intended or expected to emerge, and not whether such a provision is desirable or necessary. Parliament has formulated eight
specific guidelines which the Committee uses to decide whether
the special attention of the House should be invoked. Under
these eight guidelines the Committee may investigate a regulation and call Parliament's attention to it if the regulation: imposes a pecuniary obligation on the public revenue; is not open
to challenge in the courts; appears to make unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred; purports to have retrospective
effect where the enabling act grants no such authority; is delayed
unjustifiably in being laid or published before Parliament; is
delayed unjustifiably in notifying House officials in the case of
an order not effective until laid; is deserving of special attention
due to its form or purport; or is drafted defectively. The
Committee has the power to require written or oral testimony
from the agencies, and must give the administrator a chance to
explain himself, before the Committee draws the attention of the
House.5 4 Thus the Committee, in essence, is a screening device,
which reports to the House that a given rule is satisfactory or
that the regulation requires Parliament's attention as judged by
the Committee's set frame of reference.
The Laying System's Effectiveness
Both the work load of the Committee and its contribution
to the success of the laying system have been substantial. The
present British legislative controls furnish a type of parliamenta52. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. Rmv. 638, 643 (1956).
53. Id. at 644-50.

54. J. GRIFFITH & H.
(5th ed. 1973).

STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

88-90
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ry review which is preventive in nature rather than remedial.
This avoids both the expense and delay inherent in judicial
review. Also, the Committee's very existence is a cogent influence on administrators, inducing them to guard against bad
draftsmanship as well as outright abuses of power.55 Therefore,
the Committee has had a positive effect on the laying system as a
whole. It has made Parliament's control over previously delegated powers more effective.
The effect of the Committee's review function not only has
prevented many administrative shortcomings, but also, has saved
vast amounts of valuable time for Parliament. Laying in the
House of Commons has virtually ceased. Between 1966 and
1971 the Committee on Statutory Instruments examined 3,623
statutory instruments and brought only fifty-one of them to the
House's attention. Twenty-eight of those brought to the House's
attention overstepped the agency's legislatively granted powers,
and sixteen were poorly drafted. With the Committee's establishment it can no longer be said that supervision of governmental departments and their statutory instruments by Parliament is
totally ineffective.5 6
Thus, the British system of laying has developed into a
workable legislative control. Even though there has been no
parliamentary requirement that all enabling acts use this procedure, it has become an accepted, unwritten requirement in the
English governmental system.
THE LAYING SYSTEM'S USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States use of the laying system as a legislative

control over administrative agencies differs little in principle
from the British experience. In the federal system Congress
uses laying only in those special circumstances where it determines that its supervision of administrative activity is required.
Generally, these provisions are negative in form.57 In contrast,
the states which have adopted legislative controls require all
rules promulgated by their state agencies to be subject to some
form of legislative review.5 8 Review ranges from a type of
55. Boner & Stayton, Co-ordination in Government: A Legislative
Responsibility, 39 TEx. L. REV. 20, 34 (1960); see Schubert, Legislative Adjudication Of Administrative Regulation, 7 J. PUB. L. 135, 137 (1958).
56. J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9091 (5th ed. 1973).
57. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
58. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-170 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
See Schubert, Legislative Adjudication Of Administrative Legislation, 7
J. PUB. L. 135, 138 (1958); Trubek, Will The Connecticut Administrative
Procedure Act Frustrate Environmental Protection?, 46 CONN. B.J. 438,

440 (1972).
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review like the English model, placing emphasis on a review
committee,5 9 to direct legislative consideration of a rule with the
power to annul. 6° The federal system will be discussed first,
and then the states' experiences with the laying system will be
evaluated in order to discern how close the states' practices
accord with the English model. Then, the practicality of the
laying procedure will be evaluated and its constitutionality discussed.
The Federal Experience
Congress has used the laying system where it determined
that administrative details could be handled best by an agency,
and also where it wanted to participate in making decisions which
might have important policy implications. 6 ' Whether the agency rules are to be laid before a congressional committee6 2 or
before the entire legislative body,6 3 only in the case of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is an English-type scrutiny committee utilized. 4 For the most part, all that is involved at the
federal level is a simple, negative system of legislative review
designed to give Congress the final word on a given administrative action.
Examples where Congress has reserved to itself the power to
review changes concerning institutional bodies of government
are the Reorganization Acts and the enabling legislation regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The various Reorgan59. E.g.,

ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.20.460, 44.62.320 (1976).
60. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 308 (d)-308 (e) (West 1976).
61. Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making,
32 U. CIN. L. REV. 33, 43 (1963). For a list of legislative provisions sub-

ject to simple or concurrent resolution of the Congress, see Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
L. REV. 983, 1089-94 (1975).
62. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2071 (1970).
63. E.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 2281(g) (1970).
64. In 1957, there was a movement to create a standing committee
on administrative procedure in the House of Representatives. Among
CAL.

other duties, this committee would have performed many of the functions
of the English Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, and would

have had limited authority to examine the merits of the administrative
action.

This movement never succeeded.

See Schwartz, Legislative

Oversight: Control of Administrative Agencies, 43 A.B.A.J. 19, 21
(1957).

This matter has once again arisen in Congress. A number of bills
have been introduced in the House, that represent Congress' first attempt
to institutionalize a general policy which subjects nearly all administra-

tive regulations to Congressional veto. For a discussion of these provis-

sions, see Note, Congressional Veto Of Administrative Action: The Probable Response To A Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285, 28587; Stewart, Constitutionality Of The Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS.
593, 593-97 (1976),

526 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10: 515

ization Acts from 1939 to 1971615 have given the President of the
United States broad powers to reorganize the executive branch
of the government. Under the 1939 and 1945 Acts, a concurrent resolution by both Houses of Congress was required to keep
the plan from going into effect.6 0 The Acts of 1949 to 1971
provided that unless either House of Congress objects by concur-7
rent resolution within a sixty day period the plan is valid.
Because the powers delegated to the President were so important, Congress deemed it necessary to establish a laying system
in order to exercise direct control and to preserve its congressionally established policies.6 8
Also, the enabling act granting the Supreme Court power
to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required the
Chief Justice to report the proposed rules to Congress. If within
ninety days Congress did not disapprove, the rules took effect.6 1
Thus Congress reserved the power to veto any rule as a control
over the Supreme Court; and the rationale was similar to that
which Congress expressed in the Reorganization Acts.
Congress also has reserved the power, through laying control devices, to review rules promulgated under substantive legislation. The laying system has been used to review interstate civil
defense compacts entered into by the Civil Defense Administrator. Such a compact is to be laid before Congress and is
operative unless Congress, by a concurrent resolution, annuls the
regulation.7 0 In respect to alien deportation, if the Attorney
General suspends the deportation of an alien such suspension
must be laid before Congress. If Congress passes a concurrent
resolution stating that it disapproves of the suspension of depor71
tation during the current session, the suspension is cancelled.
And in the 1974 amendments to the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Act of 1966,72 a new section was added providing that
new motor vehicle standards must be laid before Congress for a
sixty day period. Such standard becomes effective unless both
65. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-913 (1970).
66. Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making,
32 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 33, 43-44 (1963).
67. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1970).
68. H.R. REP. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 reprinted in [1949] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1381, 1385, 1390. See also Schwartz, Legislative
Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1031, 1036 (1955).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
70. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2281(g) (1970).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1970). Under subsection (c) (3), the Attorney General must cancel the deportation proceedings if Congress
passes a resolution favoring suspension proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)
(3) (1970).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1410 (1970).
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Houses of Congress disapprove the standard by concurrent reso3
lution. 1
A further example of Congress' use of the laying system is
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in
197474 and 1976.7' The 1971 Act as amended in 1974 provided
that each rule promulgated by the Federal Election Commission must be laid before the Senate or House of Representatives with an explanation and justification of the rule. If
the House or Senate, or both acting together, do not disapprove
the rule so laid within thirty days, the Commission may then
promulgate the rule.7 6 In Buckley v. Valeo,7 7 however, the
Supreme Court held the Federal Election Campaign Act unconstitutional, but refused to consider the constitutionality of the
laying system per se.7 8 Justice White, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, did consider the laying system and argued
strongly for its constitutionality.7 9 This prompted Congress to
include the same laying controls in the new Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976.80 Again, Congress has
reserved to itself the last word on matters of special policy
importance. Each new rule adopted by the Federal Election
Commission must be cleared by the legislature.
The legislation surrounding the use of atomic energy in the
1950's presents a unique variation of the laying procedure in the
federal system. The annulment power is entrusted with Congress, but the Joint 'Committee on Atomic Energy acts as a
scrutiny committee recommending to Congress action on matters
of a very specialized nature. This legislation provides that the
Congressional Committee be a "watchdog" over the Atomic
Energy Commission's actions. The Commission's actions are
valid unless the Joint Committee recommends, within thirty or
forty-five days, that a given agency rule be annulled by Congress."'
The legislative intent of these provisions is to give
73. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1410b (a)-1410b (d) (West Cum. Supp. 1976).
74. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-456
(West Supp. 1976), as amended by The Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263.

75. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 2 U.S.C.A.

§§ 431-456 (West Supp. Sept., 1976).

76. 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(c) (West Supp. Sept., 1976).
77. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. Id. at 140 n.176.
79. Id. at 284-86.

80. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-456 (West Supp. Sept., 1976).

81. 42 U.S.C. § 2204 (1970) (review of electric utility contract, 30 day
period for which the Committee may recommend action to Congress);
id. § 2071 (review of what is defined as special nuclear material,

30 day period for which the Committee may recommend action to Congress); id. § 2078 (review of price provisions, 45 day period for
which the Committee may recommend action to Congress); id. § 2091
(review of what is necessary source material, 30 day period for
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Congress the last word in a very extraordinary policy area that is
wrought with danger.8 2 In fact, one commentator has suggested
that the Joint Committee is an active board of directors, establishing policies to be implemented by management, the Atomic
83
Energy Commission.
These examples of the laying system at the federal level
illustrate Congress' present use of and purpose in the negative
laying system-to reserve the last word on matters of special
policy importance. Congress has used the laying system as a legislative control over administrative agencies only when it determined that a special policy interest was present which required
-its special attention and review. Thus, the utilization of the
laying system at the federal level does not resemble the pervasive
use of the laying system in England; and, with the exception of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the federal laying system does not employ scrutinizing committees as does England.
In fact, the federal laying procedures present a very conservative
pattern of practice when contrasted with state usage in America.
The States: The Experimental Laboratory
for Legislative Control
American states have served as laboratories to determine
the desirability and effectiveness of using methods of legislative
control analogous to the British system. While the federal
system has used the laying system only in extraordinary circumstances, state systems have been innovative in their application
of legislative controls and have applied the controls generally to
all rules promulgated by the states' agencies. Four patterns of
usage characterize the states' laying systems. First, one state
employs straight legislative annulment.8 4 Second, some states
grant annulment power to their attorney general.8 5 Third, a few
states entrust a legislative committee solely with the power of
administrative review leaving the power of annulment in the
which the Committee may recommend action to Congress); id. § 2153
(1970 & Supp. V 1975) (cooperation with other nations, 30 day period
for which the Committee may recommend action to Congress).
82. Morrison, Federal Support Of Domestic Atomic Power Development-The Policy Issues, 12 VAND. L. REV. 195, 220 (1959). See Bunn,
Missile Limitation: By Treaty Or Otherwise?, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1415 (1970).
83. Green, The Joint Committee On Atomic Energy: A Model For
Legislative Reform?, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 939-40 (1964).
84. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 308(d)-308(e) (West 1976). See
Andrews, Relationship Between Administrators and the California Legislature, 44 CAL. L. REV. 293 (1956).
85. IND. CODE § 4-22-2-5 (1974); MINN. STAT. §15.0412(4) (1975); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-02 to 28-32-03 (1974); TENN CODE ANN. §§ 4-510
(a), 4-510 (e) (2) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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legislature."" Fourth, newly revised Administrative Procedure
Acts in four states have adopted a combination of attorney
general, legislative committee, and full legislative review. 87 A
fifth method of control over administrative action, which is relied
upon in most states, simply leaves administrative review8 to the
8
judiciary, thus not using any system of legislative control.
Legislative Annulment
One state has adopted legislative annulment as its sole
legislative control over administrative action. This laying system resembles the usage of the negative procedures employed in
England prior to the creation of the Scrutiny Committee.
Oklahoma state law provides that either House of the legislature may disapprove any rule promulgated by a state agency
through a resolution made within thirty days after the rule has
been transmitted to the legislature.8 9 Failure of the legislature
to disapprove a rule has the effect of actually favoring the rule.,,
Except for the thirty day time limit, this system is a replica of
England's negative laying system; that is, all rules must be laid
before the legislature and are valid unless otherwise disapproved
by a resolution of either House of the legislature. 91
At one time Virginia had a system providing for legislative
annulment. Either House of the Virginia legislature was empowered to adopt a resolution declaring any agency rule null and
void.92 This sytem, however, was repealed by the Administrative Process Act, 93 and it now appears that Virginia will allow
4
only judicial review of promulgated rules."
Attorney General Annulment
The second pattern of usage of the laying system in the
states has been the entrustment of annulment of agency regula86. ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.20.400, .460, 44.62.320 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 13.087, .090 (Cum. Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 171.709-.713 (1975).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-169 to 4-171 (West Cum. Supp.
1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A.4, .8 (West 1976); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
3.560(133), .560(145), .560(146), .560(151), .560(152) (Cum. Supp.
1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-904(2), 84-905.01, 84-908, 84-908.01 (1976).
88. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.05 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).
89. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 308(d)-308(e) (West 1976),
90. Id. See Harris, Administrative Practice And Procedure: Comparative State Legislation, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 37 (1953); Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 24-25
(1964).
91. J.

GRIFFITH

& H.

STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

81-

83 (5th ed. 1973).
92. VA. CODE § 9-6.9(d) (1973) (repealed 1975).
93. VA. CODE §§ 9-6.14:1-:2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
94. Id. §§ 9-6.14:9, :15-:19. For a discussion presaging the repeal of
Virginia's laying system, see McFarland & Boyd, The General Adminis-

trative Agencies Act: A Major Problem In Statutory Construction, 46

VA. L. REV. 808, 829 (1960).
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tions with the state's attorney general. This pattern goes beyond
Britain's type of laying system into an area popularly termed

"executive clearance." '

5

Such provisions require that rules be

96
approved by the attorney general before they can take effect.
Interesting variations on this general practice are found in Indiana, which requires not only the attorney general's approval but
also the state governor's approval;1 7 and in Minnesota, which

sets a twenty day time period in which the attorney general must
make his determination.98 Thus, the state attorney general
replaces the legislature as the reviewer and controller of administrative action. The state attorney general judges the legal effect
of * given rule and thereby exerts control over administrative
action.
Legislative Review Committee

The third form of laying system utilized in the states entrusts to a legislative review committee control of agency practices with no specific annulment powers over the agency's regulation. Instead, the committee is to settle any objections it may
have to a proposed regulation with the state agency concerned
and with either the appropriate legislative committee or the full
legislature.
Alaska, which formerly employed a straight legislative annulment system, recently formed a scrutiny committee whose
main function is to recommend when the annulment power of
the legislature should be exercised."" The committee, composed
of members of both Houses of the legislature, has specifically
enumerated powers. 0 0 It has the power to adopt rules over its
own procedures, to hold public hearings, to require full cooperation of the state agency in giving the committee needed information, to examine all regulations promuigated by the state agen95. Schwartz, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1037
(1955).
96. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-02 to 28-32-03 (1974); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-510 (a), 4-510(e) (2) (Cum.Supp. 1976).
97. IND. CODE § 4-22-2-5 (1974). See Dionisopoulos, Procedural Safeguards In Administrative Rule Making In Indiana, 37 IND. L.J. 423
(1962). It must be noted, however, that Nebraska also requires legislative review. The attorney general must approve the rule before the rule
is submitted to the legislature. After legislative approval, the governor
then must approve the rule before it formally takes effect.
98. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412 (1975).
99. ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.400 (1976). The statute provides that the
"establishment of the committee recognizes the need for prompt legislative review of administrative regulations filed by the lieutenant governor
to determine whether annulment under AS 44.62.320 is appropriate."
100. ALASKA STAT. § 24.20.410 (1976).
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cies to determine if they properly implement the legislature's
intent, and to make recommendations for annulment action to
the legislature. 0 1 The committee has broad powers to assure
that a given agency is acting in accordance with the legislature's
intent. If the committee determines that agency action contravenes the legislature's intent, it may recommend annulment to
1 02
the legislature as a whole.
In Oregon if either a person affected by a rule or a legislator requests that the Legislative Counsel Committee review a
certain rule, it will do so. Committee consideration of the
regulation takes into account three factors: whether the provision is in accordance with the intent and scope of the enabling
act; whether it has been adopted in accordance with the law;
and whether it is constitutional. The Commission's report is
then sent to the agency, and further, the report and any recommendations for legislative action are submitted to the House
committee in which the enabling legislation originated. 0 3 The
peculiarities of this arrangement are that the Committee is not
obligated to review all agency rules, and the Committee itself
serves as an intermediary between the agency and the legislature in an attempt to resolve the objections imposed.
Kentucky utilizes a review arrangement similar to Oregon's
system. Prior to the filing of agency rules all regulations must
be submitted to the Administrative Review Subcommittee of the
Legislative Research Commission. The Subcommittee determines if the regulation conforms to its statutory authority. If
the Subcommittee finds that it does not conform, it reports such
a finding to the Legislative Research Commission. If the agency changes the regulation to conform with the Subcommittee's
findings, the Commission will approve the regulation and it
becomes valid. If, however, the agency refuses to amend its
original rule then that rule is referred by the Commission to the
appropriate legislative committee in the legislature for its consideration.1 4 It must be noted that the Commission's main purpose is to advise and assist agencies in the preparation of their
regulations. 0 5 The Commission itself has no direct coercive
powers of control.
101. Id. § 24.20.460.

102. Id. In § 44.62.320, the annulment power of the legislature is described. This section allows annulment where the legislature adopts
a concurrent resolution to annul in either one house or both. It must
be noted that this veto power is very broad. Because no laying period
is specified, a regulation may be annuled at any time. This is in direct
contrast to the English system which has always employed some type
of laying period. Id. § 44.62.320.
103. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 171.709, .713 (1975).
104. Ky. REV. STAT. § 13.087 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
105. Id. § 13.090.
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Both Kentucky's and Oregon's systems of legislative control

seem, on their face, to be very different from the English model.
In spirit, however, they are very similar. One of the underlying
purposes of Britain's Select Committee on Statutory Instruments
is to eliminate problems in subordinate legislation before Parliament must take extraordinary action, i.e., annul the regulation.

06

The Committee has been very successful in minimizing such
problems and reducing Parliament's workload. This minimization of objections to agency rules is also the goal that Kentucky and Oregon are trying to achieve through their respective
control provisions. Although the threat of indirect coercive
control through the Committee's powers to recommend annulment is ever present, such a threat is subordinated to a climate of
cooperation and compromise. Hence, a working relationship
between administrator and legislator is created through this
system in order to insure that the legislative intent, as embodied
in the enabling act, is being fulfilled.
Kansas recently has modified the annulment power of its
legislature and has established a unique variation of the laying
system. In April, 1976, Kansas introduced a legislative scrutiny
committee concept into its system of legislative control over
administrative agencies. Previously, Kansas law provided that an
agency rule was effective as long as the agency did not amend or
revoke it, or until the legislature disapproved or rejected the rule
through a duly adopted joint resolution. 0 7 The new Kansas
system is unique in that the legislature can change an agency
rule only by enacting a bill and not merely by passing a resolution. The Revisor of Statutes, to whom the agency submits the
promulgated rules, submits the rules to the Legislative Coordinating Council. This Council then refers such rules to the
appropriate study committee for review.10 8 The Revisor of
Statutes also submits to each House of the legislature a copy of
all rules given to the Revisor. If the legislature is dissatisfied
with any rule, it may pass a bill modifying, approving, or rejecting the rule as submitted by the Revisor.10 9 The new provisions
clearly state that if these procedures are not followed the rule
will have no force or effect." 0
Thus, although Kansas has modified the legislature's annulment power, it still has retained a variation of the laying
106. See note 55 supra.

107.

KAN.

STAT.

§ 77-425 (Supp. 1975), repealed by 1976 Kan. Sess.

Laws ch. 415, § 6.

108. An Act Relating to Administrative Rules and Regulations of State
Agencies, ch. 415, 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws 1483 (to be codified as KAN.
§ 77-426(b)).
109. Id. at § 77-426(c).
110. Id. at § 77-425.

STAT.

1977]

Legislative Control Over Administrative Action

system. The legislature now must express its dissatisfaction of
an agency rule by passing a bill, and not merely a resolution, in
order to correct, approve or reject agency action. Furthermore,
the involvement of study committees means that the legislature is
given time to examine carefully the propriety of agency action.
Integrated System of Annulment
The fourth pattern of usage of the laying system utilized in
the states is actually a combination of the three above control
devices in one integrated system. In Iowa, Connecticut, and
Michigan examination of agency rules and subsequent approval
of them is required by the attorney general, a legislative committee and the legislature. In Nebraska the governor, attorney general, Legislative Committee on Administrative Agency Rules
and Regulations, and the legislature all must consider and approve every agency rule. The systems of Michigan and Connecticut are especially instructive because those two states have
been experimenting with administrative controls since the late
1940's. The experience which results from this experimentation
is displayed both in the complexity and the integration of many
different control devices which provide effective legislative regulation of administrative activities.
Nebraska combines governor, attorney general, legislative
review committee, and legislative approval of agency regulations
in its integrated system of legislative control. The Legislature's
Committee on Administrative Agency Rules and Regulations
continuously studies and evaluates rules adopted by agencies and
reports its recommendations to the legislature."' The Committee has power to recommend to the legislature that "the original
enabling legislation serving as authority for promulgation of
such rules be repealed, changed, altered, amended, or modified
in such manner as it deems advisable." 112 If the legislature so
acts in any of these means, the agency promulgation thereunder
The Attorney General also is required to
may be void.'1r
review the rule. He considers the rule's statutory authority,
114
constitutionality, and then either adopts or annuls the rule.
Finally, the Governor must approve the legislature's action of
amending, repealing, or adopting the rule in order for such
action to be effective." 5 There are two unique variations in
Nebraska's review system. First, the legislative committee, in111. NEB. Rsv. STAT. §§ 84-908-.01 (1976).

112. Id. § 84-904(2).

113. Id.
114. Id. § 84-905.01.

115. Id. § 84-908.
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stead of recommending changes to the proposed rule, evaluates
the underlying enabling legislation and suggests action by the
legislature to cure certain defects in the enabling legislation.
Second, the requirement of governor approval eliminates the
constitutional objection made to the laying system that the governor's veto power is superseded.
In Iowa, if the attorney general or the Administrative Rules
Committee objects to a proposed rule because it is arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise beyond the delegated authority of the
agency, the agency concerned is notified. If the agency then
tries to enforce the rule without changing it the agency has the
burden of proof in court to establish why the changes were not
made. 116 The Administrative Rules Committee, in addition to
this control, may refer the rule to the appropriate legislative
committee, and this committee may in turn recommend that the
rule be overturned by the full legislature.17 Thus, Iowa's control
procedure integrates the attorney general, the Administrative
Rules Committee, and the Iowa legislature into one mode. Three
aspects of Iowa's system, however, must be noted. First, the
Committee's role in the system is more in the nature of an
arbitrator than a controller, as is the case in Kentucky and
Oregon. Second, only the legislature has annulment power over
agency regulations in Iowa. And third, the legislature's annulment power can be exercised only through passage of a bill.
Since 1945 Connecticut has required that all agency rules
be subject to approval by the state attorney general and be
subject to annulment in the legislature. 118 The 1975 amendments to Connecticut's Administrative Procedure Act retained
the spirit of the 1945 controls, but further refined those controls
into a three step process. First, the attorney general has thirty
days after receiving a proposed regulation to rule on its legal
sufficiency. The rule is not operative until his approval is given.
If he fails to disapprove the rule within the given time period
his approval is assumed and the rule is deemed operative. ' "
Second, all regulations are laid before the Legislative Review
Commission for sixty-five days. If the Commission fails to give
notice of disapproval to the agency within the sixty-five day
period the regulation is deemed approved. But if the Commission does give notice of its disapproval, the agency may take no
further action to implement the regulations unless the legislature
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.4, .8 (1975).
117. Id. § 17A.8.
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-46, 4-49 (West 1969)
1972).
119. Id. § 4-169 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).

(repealed
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holds otherwise.' 20 Third, each regulation disapproved by the
'Commission is laid before the General Assembly. The General
Assembly either disapproves the rule or takes no further action.
If the General Assembly takes no action during its regular
session, it is deemed to have approved the rule, and thus the
12
regulation becomes operative. '
Thus, Connecticut also has an integrated system of administrative control. The attorney general operates under a negative laying system; unless he disapproves a regulation within
thirty days he is deemed to have approved the rule. The
Legislative Review Commission also operates under a negative
laying framework; unless it gives notice of disapproval to the
agency within sixty-five days the regulation is approved. And
finally, the legislature itself is under a negative laying system;
unless it approves of the disapproval by the Commission, the regulation becomes effective despite the Commission's disapproval. This three-tiered process of laying, which is a hybrid of the
basic English annulment system, reflects a desire for an effective
system of review involving both executive and legislative authorities.
Michigan's system of legislative controls over administrative agencies dates back to the late 1940's,' 22 and presently, its
system resembles Connecticut's. Yet, like all other state systems
previously discussed, it too has its own peculiarities.
Michigan sets out its current system of control in its Administrative Procedures Act of 1970.123 After the Legislative
Service Bureau certifies the propriety of the form of a given
regulation, and the attorney general deems the regulation legal,
it is transmitted to the Joint Committee on Administrative
Rules.'12 If the Committee approves the regulation it is filed by
the agency with the Secretary of State and becomes operative. If
the regulation is disapproved a concurrent resolution is introduced in either of both Houses of the legislature to annul the
regulation. If the legislature adopts the resolution the agency
cannot file its regulation with the Secretary of State' 25 because
legislative certification is denied; thus the regulation is not promulgated and is not effective. But if the legislature does not
120. Id. § 4-170. Connecticut also empowers its Legislative Review
Commission to consider any past rule. Id. § 4-170a.

121. Id. § 4-171.
122. Schubert, Legislative Adjudication Of Administrative Rule Making, 7 J. PUB. L. 135 (1958).
123. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(101)-.560(215) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
124. The statutory provisions for the creation and procedures of the
committee are Id. §§ 3.560 (135) -.560 (136).
125. The statutory provision for the filing of regulations is Id. § 3.560
(146).
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adopt the resolution in a three month period it is deemed to have
given certification; thus the agency may file the rule despite the

Joint Committee's disapproval. 12

Thus, in Michigan's system of control over administrative
action the attorney general and state legislature have specific
annulment powers which may stop further application of a given
regulation. Similar to the Connecticut and Iowa systems, the
executive and legislative authorities in Michigan combine to
provide a thorough system of control over administrative excesses.
JudicialAnnulment

The fifth device utilized by the states to control administrative action does not involve an implementation of the laying
system. States with no laying system rely solely on judicial review as their control over agency abuse. Although the absence of
laying provisions is rare in England, the opposite is true among
the states. In fact, both Virginia and Wisconsin have abandoned their laying systems in favor of judicial review. Wisconsin's experience is especially instructive in demonstrating the
vulnerability of the laying system to attacks of unconstitutionality.
In 1953 Wisconsin formally introduced the laying system,
applying it to all rules promulgated by state agencies. 127 One
year later, however, the Wisconsin legislature abandoned the
annulment system because the state attorney general ruled that
the system was unconstitutional. 128 It is interesting to note that
it was the supposed unconstitutionality, and not the ineffectiveness of laying, that led to the system's demise.1 29 The Wisconsin legislature subsequently created a legislative review committee. This committee was empowered to recommend changes to
the agencies regarding rules they promulgated, but the committee had no coercive control.3 0 In 1966, Wisconsin seemingly
returned to a system of judicial review,"' as the legislature
126. Id. § 3.560 (145). Michigan also provides a review procedure for
past rules promulgated and filed, and allows the joint committee to suspend the effect of a questionable rule when the legislature is not in session. Id. §§ 3.560(151)-.560(152).
127. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 227.031 (1957).
128. 43 Op. AT'Y GEN. 350 (Wis. 1954). See Boles, The Post-Hearing
Stage Of The Administrative Rule Making Process In Wisconsin: The
Conservation Commission, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 251 (1956); Helstad, New
Law On Administrative Rule Making, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 407, 428-29; Helstad & Boyer, Legislative Controls of Administrative Rule Making, 41
A.B.A.J. 1048 (1955).
129. 43 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 350 (Wis. 1954).
130. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.041 (1957) (repealed 1966).
131. Id. § 227.05 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-1977).

1977]

Legislative Control Over Administrative Action

repealed the legislative review committee provisions. 132 Thus
Wisconsin's legislative controls over administrative action were
eroded slowly over a thirteen year period. Only Virginia has
followed Wisconsin's example in abolishing its legislative control
133
system.
Therefore, the states, in contrast to the federal system,
provide many diversified patterns of legislative controls. These
systems use variations of the basic British laying devices. One
state uses only simple annulment while others use committee
review in conjunction with the threat of legislative disapproval.
Just as the English system grew from simple annulment to
committee involvement, so have many of the state systems. Even
though the British and American systems may differ in form and
detail, their substance and purpose remain the same-to provide
effective control over the administrative process.
An Evaluation of the Laying System's Use
in the United States
Legislative control of administrative rulemaking seems to
be a preferable system to other forms of control.13 4 Yet, the
laying system has been adopted in few states, and has been used
infrequently by Congress. The main reasons for this infrequent
use seem to be a fear that the laying system is too cumbersome,
and a general prejudice that such systems are unconstitutional.
After discussing the practicality of the laying system, the constitutional arguments for and against laying will be discussed and
assessed.
The Practicality of Laying in Achieving Effective Control over
Administrative Action
The laying system has been criticized for being too cumbersome and impractical because legislators do not have the time to
consider every rule promulgated by each of the various administrative agencies. 135 Authorities who looked to the English laying system before the creation of the Scrutiny Committee generally concluded that a procedure of laying each rule before the
132. Id. § 227.041 (1957)

(repealed 1966).

133. See note 94 supra.
134. An example of non-legislative control over administrative action
is judicial review. Judicial control is inadequate because it is by nature
incomplete, piecemeal, very slow and very expensive. Also, the courts
cannot effectively exercise day-to-day review of agency action. See
Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After, 52
CAL. L. REV. 513, 523-25 (1964); Boner & Stayton, Co-ordinationin Government: A Legislative Responsibility, 39 TEx. L. REV. 20, 34-35 (1960).
135. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 667 (1956).
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legislature was ineffective.1 3c The backlog of rules and the consequent inadequate review of agency action by Parliament made
the laying system more of a burden than a benefit to efficient
government.
Now that the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments
has made the English control system a success, however, commentators agree that the laying system, consisting of legislative
annulment only after a select committee examines each rule, is a
practical and noncumbersome control device. 137 The main advantage of the laying system is its direct control over administrative agencies. Such a system allows legislatures to regulate
agencies to insure that administrators stay within their delegated
powers. As is shown so poignantly in the English system, the
use of a body of legislative specialists to review each agency
regulation, rather than the cumbersome supervision by an entire
body of legislators, has made the laying system workable. Each
individual legislator no longer must examine each rule. Rather,
only those agency rules which the reviewing committee determines merit full legislative consideration reach every legisla-

tor.1

38

The practicality of the laying system is demonstrated also in
Michigan's control provisions. 139 Three stages of consideration
mold an operative and effective system in that state. First, the
legality of every regulation is fully analyzed by the Attorney
General. Second, discrepancies between the legislature's intent
and the agency's rule can be worked out in a noncoercive
fashion through legislative specialists who form the legislative
review committee. And third, coercive powers of the legislature
are available if the agency refuses to cooperate. The full legislature need consider the rule only if the agency refuses to compromise after the attorney general and the committee recommendations have been made. In this manner, ultra vires administrative
activity is checked even though the legislature does not consider
the merits of every rule.
The recent adoption of the concept of a legislative screening committee to assist the legislature in controlling agency action in Alaska, 140 Nebraska, 1 4 and Kansas 142 further evidences
the practicality of the laying system. All three states previ136. Schwartz, Legislative Control Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1035-36
(1955).
137. See note 56 supra.
138. Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative
Agencies: The Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 667 (1956).
139. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(101)-.560(215) (Cum. Supp. 1976).

140. ALASKA STAT. §§ 24.20.400, .460 (1976).
141. NF. REV. STAT. § 84-904(2) (1976).
142. KAN. STAT. §§ 77-426(b) to 77-426(c) (1977).
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ously employed straight annulment systems, but have switched
to a laying system integrating committee review and full legislative annulment. Upon review of each of their Administrative Procedure Acts, these three states further refined their
laying systems, rather than abandoning them altogether. This
recent development in the states evidences acceptance of the
laying system as a useful tool of control.
Therefore, the practicality of the laying system is clear. A
legislative committee given strict standards of review replaces the
full legislature as the chief screening device of excessive agency
action. Each legislator, not having to consider the merits of every
regulation, may still be assured that agency action is within its
delegated boundaries. In addition, the laying system provides a
continuous and certain method of. review without unduly burdening the legislature and it leaves each legislator free to consider more important matters.
The Prejudice against the Constitutionalityof the Laying System
A belief by some legal scholars that legislative controls are
unconstitutional has retarded the laying system's use in the
United States. Springing from an unfavorable Attorney General's report in 1933,' 4 3 a prejudice developed against the constitutionality of the laying system. However, that prejudice is on the
wane today. Even though the Supreme Court has never ruled
definitively on the constitutionality of the laying system the
present weight of the law favors such a system and holds it
1 44
constitutional.
Opponents of the laying system generally point out two
constitutional flaws. First, they argue that the laying system
represents an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to take legislative action without the concurrence of the President and thus
violates his veto power. Second, they contend that laying provisions represent attempts by Congress either to assume executive
functions which the Constitution requires to be performed by the
President or by other executive officers, or to vest legislative
powers in a single House. 14 5 The first argument deals with the
President's veto power as contained in article I, section 7 of the
United States Constitution; the second argument refers to the
"separation of powers" doctrine.' 46
143. 37 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 56 (1933).
144. See Stewart, Constitutionality Of The Legislative Veto, 13 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 593 (1976).
145. Ginnane, The Control Of Federal Administration By Congressional Resolution And Committees, 66 HARv. L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1953).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3: "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote

to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
"
may be necessary ... shall be presented to the President ....
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Both New Hampshire and Wisconsin have held their respective laying provisions unconstitutional on the theory that
such procedures abridge the Executive's veto power. The Reorganization Acts of New Hampshire, which gave the governor
power to rearrange his executive agencies subject to annulment
by the legislature, was found unconstitutional. In the Opinion
of the Justices,14 1 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that
the Reorganization Act was invalid since its annulment provisions did not follow the well understood parliamentary procedure of governor approval. 48 The Wisconsin Attorney General
followed a similar theory. A statutory enactment which gave
the Wisconsin legislature the power to annul an agency rule was
held unconstitutional on the ground that it vitiated the governor's veto power. The reasoning behind that conclusion was as
follows: the legislature was carrying out an activity which
constituted the making of a law; a law must be submitted to the
governor for his approval by virtue of his constitutionally deleno governor approval under
gated veto power; since there was
1 49
this system, it is unconstitutional.
Thus both New Hampshire and Wisconsin found their
laying systems violative of the veto power. In both situations
the annulling legislative action was considered a law which must
be subject to the governor's review and veto. If the legislative
action is not subject to the governor's veto, the traditional mode
of legislative-executive lawmaking is not met and the spirit of
the state constitution is violated.
The second argument against the constitutionality of the
laying system is that the legislature is violating the separation of
powers doctrine by assuming executive functions. This position
contends that the laying system unlawfully grants to the legislature powerful executive duties-the administration and execution of the laws.1 50
Unsupported by clear precedent, this second argument is
the weaker of the two presented. Commentators generally cite
147.
148.
preme
salary

96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950).
Id. at 519-21, 83 A.2d at 740. In 1970, the New Hampshire SuCourt held that a legislative committee veto power over proposed
changes prior to the governor's and council's approval violated

the separation of powers provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution.
Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 359, 266 A.2d 823 (1970).
It must be noted, however, that this holding relates only to a veto
power vested in legislative committees, and not the full legislature. In
fact, the court intimated that if the full legislature would have retained
control, such veto power would be constitutionally sound. The court

stated, "[s]ince the legislature may delegate its power to fix salaries and
to name civil officers, it may properly impose conditions upon the exercise of such delegated authority." Id. at 364, 266 A.2d at 826.
149. Melville, Legislative Control Over Administrative Rule Making,
32 U. CIN. L. REV. 33, 49-50 (1963).
150. Id. at 48.
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Attorney General Mitchell's 1933 opinion in support of the
separation of powers theory. That opinion concerned the constitutionality of the power of a joint legislative commission to
review and rule on the validity of tax refunds.' 5 1 The main
theme of the Attorney General's opinion was that a joint committee does not have power to make decisions concerning the
validity of tax refunds.'12 In dicta, the Attorney General expressed constitutional reservations concerning the laying provisions of the 1932 Reorganization Act. 15 3 But in all of the
laying systems which employ a legislative scrutinizing committee, the committee only recommends to the legislature that actions be taken. The committee does not determine conclusively
the regulation's validity; rather, the legislature annuls the obtrusive rule. Thus the Attorney General's opinion may not support
conclusively the proposition that the laying system is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
Supporters of the laying system argue that there are no
separation of powers or veto problems present. First, they
contend that to disapprove a proposed regulation is not to enact
a law, hence there exists no law for the executive to veto. 154
Second, they maintain that the separation of powers principle is
not a strict doctrine dividing the branches of government into
rigid governmental compartments. Rather, the boundaries defined by separation of powers are flexible and vague. 5 The
branches of government were designed to work together to
attain a more effective government. Under this conception the
laying system is valid; the legislature delegates powers, reserving
in that grant the power to hold administrators to their legislative
guidelines. Commentators contend that a failure to preserve
controlling powers is just as obnoxious to separation of powers
as is an unchecked delegation. 15 6 Thus, supporters of the laying
system find no problems with its constitutional status.
37 Op. Ar'Y GEN. 56 (1933).
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 58.
Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto And The Constitution, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 467, 473-501 (1962); Schwartz, Legislative Control
Of Administrative Rules And Regulations: I. The American Experience,
30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031, 1044 (1955).
151.
152.
153.
154.

155. Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1927)

J. dissenting).

(Holmes,

The Court in Springer held that a Congressional com-

mittee exercising the executive power of appointment is unconstitutional.
Justice Holmes in his dissent stated, "we do not and cannot carry out
the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathmatical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were
it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is,
or that the Constitution requires." Id. at 211.
156. Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto And the Constitution, 30
L. REv. 467, 501-16 (1962). Boisvert makes a third argument.

GEo. WASH.

He claims that the President does not need formal veto powers, because
he has the most powerful veto of all: control over the budget. Boisvert,
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There is precedent in both the federal and state systems
which supports the pro-laying arguments. This authority seems
to outweigh the paucity of precedent which opponents of the
laying system present.
Attorney General Clark's testimony before the Senate concerning the Reorganization Act of 1949 clearly grants constitu15 7
tional sanction to laying procedures in the federal system.
Directly noting the 1933 opinion of Attorney General Mitchell
which suggested that the laying system is unconstitutional, Attorney General Clark answered the constitutional objections
raised by opponents to the Reorganization Acts. He stated that,
[I]n this procedure there is no question involved of the Congress
taking legislative action beyond its initial passage 'of the Reorganization Act. Nor is there any question involved of abdication
by the Executive of his Executive functions to the Congress. It
is merely a case where the Executive and the Congress act in
cooperation for the benefit of the entire Government and the
Nation. 158
Thus, in clear language the Attorney General reversed former
Attorney General Mitchell's dicta and held the laying system
constitutionally valid. Attorney General Clark found no intrusion on the President's veto power since Congress did not
legislate beyond the Reorganization Act. And he found no transgression of the separation of powers doctrine since the Executive
branch did not abdicate any of its functions to Congress.
State and federal courts also have upheld the validity of
the laying system. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 5" the Supreme
Court, while ruling on the validity of two of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, expressly upheld, in dicta, the use of the
laying system. The enabling act granting the Supreme Court
power to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required the Chief Justice to report the proposed rules to Congress.
Unless Congress took action within. ninety days, the rules would
become operative. Although the Court's precise holding dealt
with the validity of the two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court did give its explicit approval of the negative laying system. 60 Also, the 1932 Reorganization Act, which incorporated laying provisions, was upheld in the lower federal
courts."
These provisions also incorporated a negative laying
A Legislative Tool For Supervision Of Administrative Agencies: The
Laying System, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 638, 652 (1956).
157. S. REP. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1949).
158. Id. at 20.
159. 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
160. Id. at 15. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595 (1856).
161. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 14 F. Supp. 407, 412 (S.D.
N.Y. 1936), aff'd on other grounds, 300 U.S. 139 (1937); Swayne & Hoyt,
Ltd. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C. 1936), aff'd on other
prounds, 300 U,5. 297 (1937).
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procedure, giving Congress the opportunity to invalidate a given
reform proposal before it took effect. 1 2 And recently the Supreme Court had the opportunity to discuss the laying system
in Buckley v. Valeo. 1 3 Even though the Court refused to con6 4
sider the question of the constitutionality of the laying system,'
Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, did

consider

it.165

Justice White opined that a rule laid before Con-

gress no more invades the President's veto power than does
such a rule which is not laid before Congress. In his view, "the
provision for congressional disapproval of agency regulations
does not appear to transgress the constitutional design, at least
where the President has agreed to legislation establishing the
disapproval procedure or the legislation has been passed over
his veto."' 166 The Court's refusal to consider the constitutionality
of the laying system in Buckley when it clearly had an opportunity to do so, and Justice White's views supporting the constitutionality of the laying system, clearly lend credence to the
validity of such a system of legislative control. 67 Therefore,
the lower federal courts, and even the Supreme Court, have
voiced their approval of the laying system.
Furthermore, recent state cases also have supported the
laying system's constitutionality. In Watrous v. Golden Chainber of Commerce,6 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the
use of a joint resolution to approve an agency action, which
otherwise would not be effective without such legislative approval, is constitutional. The court determined that a laying procedure is not legislative in character, and thus, the governor has no
role in approving the legislature's action. 69 In Brown v. Heymann,' 70 a negative laying provision in New Jersey's Reorganization Acts was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The
court distinguished the 1950 New Hampshire decision, The
Opinion of the Justices,' 7' and cited that decision as not standing for the proposition that the laying system is unconstitutional,
but rather as standing for the proposition that if there is no clear
delegation of power to the executive to carry out reorganization
functions, the governor's power to do so is invalid. 172 The court
162. 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-913 (1970).
163. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
164. Id. at 140 n.176.

165. Id. at 284-86.
166. Id.at 286.

167. Contra, Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The
Probable Response to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285,

294-300.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

121 Colo. 521, 218 P.2d 498 (1950).

Id. at 544-46, 218 P.2d at 509-10.

62 N.J. 1, 297 A.2d 572 (1972).
Opinion of the Justices, 96 N.H. 517, 83 A.2d 738 (1950).
Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 7-8, 297 A.2d 572, 576 (1972).
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thus circumvented the New Hampshire case and held that New
Jersey's Reorganization Acts, and the laying provisions therein,
were constitutional; there was a valid delegation of power by the
New Jersey legislature. In so holding, the court abscribed to a
flexible separation of powers doctrine, stating that it is assumed
the executive and legislative branches will coordinate their activities to fulfill a common end: effective government.1 73 Thus
both state and federal precedents support the premise that the
laying system is a constitutional exercise of legislative control
over administrative agencies.
Although there has been no decision by the United States
Supreme Court on point, it appears that the laying system is
constitutionally viable in the federal and state systems, with the
exception of New Hampshire and Wisconsin. The present state
of the law, however, does not give a clear indication as to what
conditions must exist for the laying system to be deemed constitutional. The differential between a constitutional and unconstitutional determination appears to lie in the interpretation
courts and the legislatures give to their respective constitutions,
and not in a set number of prerequisites which, if met, will assure
constitutionality. A literalist will tend to hold that the laying
system is unconstitutional. Since the head of state does not
approve the legislative action, his veto power is violated. And
since the legislature is reviewing an executive act, separation of
powers, as implicitly set forth in the Constitution, is violated. A
broad constructionist, however, will generally take a more pragmatic view. He views the legislative action annulling a given
agency rule as not constituting a law, hence the veto provisions
never come into play. Furthermore, he sees separation of powers
as a flexible device to assure a well-functioning government; and
the laying system certainly aids governmental efficiency. Even
though the prejudice of unconstitutionality appears, to a great
extent, to be unfounded, a ruling on the constitutionality of a
given legislative system very much depends on what view of the
constitution the court adopts in evaluating each given system.
CONCLUSION

Legislative control over administrative rulemaking through
a laying system is desirable, effective and constitutional. As
shown above, a laying system may embody many diverse forms
and patterns. Within these different forms a common goal persists-to give the legislature direct control over administrators to
assure both that the intended ends of the enabling act are met
173. Id. at 10-12, 297 A.2d 572, 577-78.
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and that the powers exercised by the administrators in meeting
those ends are within the realm of authority so delegated to
them.
But will this legislative review of administrative actions be
so political in nature that an irresponsible legislative minority
will be able to block the advancement of the public interest?
174
These fears have been expressed frequently by commentators,
and probably would be realized in a system where the legislative
review committee is allowed to question the merits of the regulation. 17 5 The success of the English system can be attributed to
the limits imposed on legislative review of administrative rules.
Such limits disallow the legislative review committee to evaluate the merits of agency rules, but do permit the committee to
compare agency action against set legislative standards. 1 7 The
effect of this restriction is to limit committee review to an
examination of the agency's power and authority to enact a
given rule. With these review restrictions in effect, which some
state systems have already adopted, 77 legislative review works as
a device whereby legislative majorities check the abuse of power
by a bureaucratic minority.
Legislative controls, if used properly, seem essential to any
system involving legislative delegation of power to administrative
agencies. The laying system is one method of legislative control
which is best suited to assess and control the rulemaking power
of the various administrative agencies on a day-to-day basis. The
ideal system of control should consist of two factors. First, a
scrutiny committee of the legislature, armed with specific guidelines, should examine all rules to be certain the agency is within
its delegated powers. Second, if needed, the legislature should
retain coercive powers to keep the agency in line by annulling a
rule which the committee determines is excessive, and which the
agency refuses to change. Through a system such as this, both
state legislatures and the United States Congress could solve the
problem of agency accountability to the legislature. There no
longer would be inadequate and ineffective controls over administrative action.
David E. Alms
174. Trubek, Will The Connecticut Administrative Procedure Act

Frustrate Environmental Protections, 46 CONN. B.J. 438, 440 (1974). See
Schubert, Legislative Adjudication Of Administrative Legislation, 7 J.
PUB. L. 135, 161 (1958).
175. E.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-904 (1976). This section allows the leg-

islature to consider the merits of the rule by giving them the power to
amend, alter, or modify the regulation.
176. See note 36 supra.
177. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 171.709, 171.713 (1975).

